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ABSTRACT
With an increasing number of value-flow properties to check, ex-
isting static program analysis still tends to have scalability issues
when high precision is required. We observe that the key design
flaw behind the scalability problem is that the core static analysis
engine is oblivious of the mutual synergies among different prop-
erties being checked and, thus, inevitably loses many optimization
opportunities. Our approach is inter-property-aware and able to
capture possible overlaps and inconsistencies among different prop-
erties. Thus, before analyzing a program, we can make optimization
plans which decide how to reuse the specific analysis results of a
property to speed up checking other properties. Such a synergistic
interaction among the properties significantly improves the anal-
ysis performance. We have evaluated our approach by checking
twenty value-flow properties in standard benchmark programs and
ten real-world software systems. The results demonstrate that our
approach is more than 8× faster than existing ones but consumes
only 1/7 memory. Such a substantial improvement in analysis effi-
ciency is not achieved by sacrificing the effectiveness: at the time
of writing, thirty-nine bugs found by our approach have been fixed
by developers and four of them have been assigned CVE IDs due to
their security impact.
KEYWORDS
Static bug finding, demand-driven analysis, compositional program
analysis, value-flow analysis.
1 INTRODUCTION
Value flows [12, 33, 40, 43], which track how values are loaded and
stored in the program, underpin the analysis for a broad category of
software properties, such as memory safety (e.g., null dereference,
double free, etc.), resource usage (e.g., memory leak, file usage, etc.),
and security properties (e.g., the use of tainted data). In addition,
there are a large and growing number of domain-specific value-
flow properties. For instance, mobile software requires that the
personal information cannot be passed to an untrusted code [2],
and, in web applications, tainted database queries are not allowed
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to be executed [45]. Fortify,1 a commercial static code analyzer,
checks nearly ten thousand value-flow properties from hundreds of
unique categories. Value flow problems exhibit a very high degree
of versatility, which poses great challenges to the effectiveness of
general-purpose program analysis tools.
Faced with such a massive number of properties and the need
of extension, existing approaches (e.g., Fortify, CSA2 and Infer3)
provide a customizable framework together with a set of property
interfaces that enable the quick customization for new properties.
For instance, CSA uses a symbolic-execution engine such that,
at every statement, it invokes the callback functions registered
for the properties to check. The callback functions are written by
the framework users in order to collect the symbolic-execution
results, such as the symbolic memory and the path condition, so
that we can judge the presence of any property violation at the
statement. Despite the existence of many CSA-like frameworks,
when high precision like path-sensitivity is required, existing static
analyzers still cannot scale well with respect to a large number of
properties to check, which we refer to as the extensional scalability
issue. For example, our evaluation shows that CSA cannot path-
sensitively check twenty properties for many programs in ten hours.
Pinpoint [40] has already run out of 256GB memory for checking
only eight properties.
We observe that, behind the extensional scalability issue, the
key design flaw in conventional extension mechanisms (like that
in CSA) is that the core static analysis engine is oblivious to the
properties being checked. Although the property obliviousness
gives the maximum flexibility and extensibility to the framework,
it also prevents the core engine from utilizing the property-specific
analysis results for optimization. This scalability issue is slightly
alleviated by a class of approaches that are property-aware and
demand-driven [5, 26, 31]. These techniques are scalable with re-
spect to a small number of properties because the core engine can
skip certain program statements by understanding what program
states are relevant to the properties. However, in these approaches,
the semantics of properties are also opaque to each other. As a result,
when the number of properties grows very large, the performance
of the demand-driven approaches will quickly deteriorate, as in
1Fortify Static Analyzer: https://www.microfocus.com/en-us/products/static-code-
analysis-sast/
2Clang Static Analyzer: https://clang-analyzer.llvm.org/
3Infer Static Analyzer: http://fbinfer.com/
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the case of Pinpoint. To the best of our knowledge, the number of
literature specifically addressing the extensional scalability issue is
very limited. Readers can refer to Section 7 for a detailed discussion.
In this work, we advocate an inter-property-aware design to
relax the property-property and the property-engine obliviousness
so that the core static analysis engine can exploit the mutual syner-
gies among different properties for optimization. In our analysis,
such exploitation of mutual synergies are enabled by enforcing a
simple value-flow-based property model, which picks out source
and sink values, respectively, as well as the predicate over these
values for the satisfaction of the property. For instance, for a null
deference property, our property model only requires the users of
our framework to indicate where a null pointer may be created,
where the null dereference may happen, as well as a simple predi-
cate that enforces the propagation of the null pointer. Surprisingly,
given a set of properties specified in our property model, our static
analyzer can automatically understand the overlaps and inconsis-
tencies of the properties to check. Based on the understanding,
before analyzing a program, we can make dedicated analysis plans
so that, at runtime, the analyzer can transmit the analysis results
on path-reachability and path-feasibility across different proper-
ties for optimization. The optimization allows us to significantly
reduce redundant graph traversals and unnecessary invocation of
SMT solvers, two critical performance bottlenecks of conventional
approaches. Section 2 provides examples to illustrate our approach.
We have implemented our approach, named Catapult, which
is a new demand-driven and compositional static analyzer with
the precision of path-sensitivity. Like a conventional compositional
analysis [47], our implementation allows us to concurrently analyze
functions that do not have calling relations. In Catapult, we have
included all C/C++ value-flow properties thatCSA checks by default.
In the evaluation, we compare Catapult with three state-of-the-
art bug-finding tools, Pinpoint, CSA, and Infer, using a standard
benchmark and ten popular industrial-sized software systems. The
experimental results demonstrate that Catapult is more than 8×
faster than Pinpoint but consumes only 1/7 memory. It is as efficient
asCSA and Infer in terms of both time and memory cost but is much
more precise. Such promising scalability of Catapult is not achieved
by sacrificing the capability of bug finding. In our experiments,
although the benchmark software systems have been checked by
numerous free and commercial tools, Catapult is still able to detect
many previously-unknown bugs, in which thirty-nine have been
fixed by the developers and four have been assigned CVE IDs due
to their security impact.
In summary, our main contributions are listed as following:
• An inter-property-aware design for checking value-flow
properties, which mitigates the extensional scalability issue.
• A series of cross-property optimization rules that can be
made use of for general value-flow analysis frameworks.
• A detailed implementation and a systematic evaluation that
demonstrates our high scalability, precision, and recall.
2 OVERVIEW
The key factor that allows us to conquer the extensional scalability
problem is the exploitation of the mutual synergies among different
properties. In this section, we first use two simple examples to
(a) overlaps
check for
free-global-pointer
bugs
check for
memory-leak
bugs
a=malloc()
c=𝜙(a, b)
*c=1
b
X
// global pointer// heap pointer
(b) inconsistencies
a=malloc()
b=a
free(b) *b=1
check for
memory-leak
bugs
check for
null-dereference
bugsX
a≠0 a=0
pc
// heap pointer or null
Figure 1: Possible overlaps and inconsistencies among prop-
erties. Each edge represents a value flow.
illustrate the mutual synergies and then provide a running example
used in the whole paper.
2.1 Mutual Synergies
We observe that the mutual synergies among different properties
are originated from their overlaps and inconsistencies.
In Figure 1a, to check memory-leak bugs, we need to track value
flows from the newly-created heap pointer a to check if the pointer
will be freed.4 To check free-global-pointer bugs, we track value
flows from the global variable b to check if it will be freed.5 As
illustrated, the value-flow paths to search overlap from c=ϕ(a,b)
to *c=1. Being aware of such overlaps, when traversing the graph
from a=malloc() for memory-leak bugs, we can record that c=ϕ(a,b)
cannot reach any free operation. Then, when checking free-global-
pointer bugs, we can use this recorded information to immediately
stop the graph traversal at the vertex c=ϕ(a,b), thereby saving com-
putation resources.
In Figure 1b, to check memory-leak bugs, we track value flows
from the newly-created pointer a to where it is freed. To check
null-dereference bugs, considering that malloc() may return a null
pointer when memory allocation fails, we track value flows from
the same pointer a to where it is dereferenced. The two properties
have an inconsistent constraint: the former requires a,0 so that
a is a valid heap pointer while the latter requires a=0 so that a is
a null pointer. Being aware of the inconsistency, when traversing
the graph for checking null dereferences, we can record whether
pc (the path condition from a=malloc() to b=a) and pc∧a=0 can be
satisfied. If pc can be satisfied but pc∧a=0 not, we can confirm that
pc∧a,0 must be satisfiable without an expensive constraint-solving
procedure, thus speeding up the process of checking memory leaks.
2.2 A Running Example
Let us describe a running example using the value-flow graph in
Figure 3, where we check null-deference and free-global-pointer
bugs following the workflow in Figure 2. Given the program, we
firstly follow previous works to build the value-flow graph [12, 40,
44]. With the graph in hand, we check the two properties with
the precision of path-sensitivity. Here, path-sensitivity means that
when searching paths on the value-flow graph, we will invoke an
4In the paper, a pointer p is “freed” means it is used in the function call free(p). We
will detail how to use the value-flow information to check bugs later.
5Freeing a pointer pointing to memory not on the heap (e.g., memory allocated by
global variables) is buggy. See details in https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/590.html
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property 
specifications
graph traversal 
plan
optimization 
plan bug reportsengine of graph 
traversal
plan maker
core engine
key novelty: a plan maker is inserted in a conventional design
Figure 2: The workflow of our approach.
1. char* empty_str = "";
2. void main() {
3. char* a;
4. if (𝛾1) {
5. p = malloc(…); a = p; // heap pointer or null
6. } else {
7. a = empty_str; // nonheap pointer
8. }
9. if (𝛾2) { b = a; free(b); }
10.
11. if (𝛾3) { c = a; *c = 1; }
12.
13. if (𝛾4) { d = a; free(d); }
14. }
d
p
a
free(d)
empty_str
// nonheap pointer// may be null
free(b)
b
*c = 1
c
𝛾1
𝛾4 𝛾2 𝛾3
￢𝛾1
Figure 3: An example to illustrate our method.
SMT solver to solve path conditions and other property-specific
constraints, so that infeasible paths are pruned.
The Property Specifications. As is common practice, users of
our framework need to provide the property specifications. The
users are responsible for the correctness of the specifications.
In this paper, we focus on value-flow properties, which are
checked by examining a series of value-flow paths from certain
source values to some sink values. As an overview, the specifications
of the two properties are described as two quadruples:
prop null-deref := (v = malloc(_); _ = ∗v, ∗v = _;v = 0; never)
prop free-glob-ptr := (glob; free(v); true; never)
As illustrated above, the specification of a value-flow property
consists of four parts which are separated by the semicolons. The
first and second parts are the source and sink values. The values
are specified by pattern expressions, which represent the values
at certain statements. The uninterested values are written as “_”.
In the example, the source values of null-deref and free-glob-ptr
are the return pointer of malloc() and the global pointer empty_str,
respectively. The sink value of null-deref is the dereferenced value
c at the statement *c=1 The sink values of free-glob-ptr are the freed
values at free(b) and free(d).
The third part is a property-specific constraint, which is the
precondition on which the bug can happen. The constraint of null-
deref is to require the value on a value-flow path to be a null pointer,
i.e., v = 0. The property free-glob-ptr does not have any specific
constraint and, thus, puts true in the quadruple.
The predicate “never” means that value-flow paths between the
specified sources and sinks should never be feasible. Otherwise, a
bug exists.
The Core Static Analysis Engine. Before the analysis, our
core engine automatically makes analysis plans based on the speci-
fications. The analysis plans include the graph traversal plan and
the optimization plan. In the example, we make the following op-
timization plans: (1) checking free-glob-ptr before null-deref ; (2)
when traversing the graph for checking free-glob-ptr, we record
the vertices that cannot reach any sink vertex of null-deref. The
graph traversal plan in the example is trivial, which is to traverse
the graph from each source vertex of each property.
In Figure 3, when traversing the graph from empty_str to check
free-glob-ptr, the core engine will visit all vertices except p to look
for free operations. According to the optimization plan, during the
graph traversal, the core engine records that b and d cannot reach
any dereference operation.
For null-deref, we traverse the graph from p. When visiting b and
d , since the previously-recorded information tells that they cannot
reach any sink vertex, we prune the subsequent paths from b and d
and only need to continue the graph traversal from c .
It is noteworthy that if we check null-deref before free-glob-ptr,
we only can prune one path from c for free-glob-ptr based on the
results of null-deref (see Section 4.2.1). We will further explain the
rationale of our analysis plans in the following sections.
3 VALUE-FLOW PROPERTIES
This section provides a specificationmodel for value-flow properties
with the following two motivations. On the one hand, we observe
that many property-specific constraints play a significant role in
performance optimization. The specific constraints of a property
not only can be used to optimize the property itself, but also can
benefit other properties being checked together. Existing value-
flow analyses either ignore or do not well utilize property-specific
constraints, which exacerbates the extensional scalability issue.
On the other hand, despite many studies on value-flow analy-
sis [12, 33, 40, 43, 44], we are still lack of a general and extensible
specification model that can widen the opportunities of sharing
analysis results across different properties. Some of the existing
studies only focus on checking a specific property (e.g., memory
leak [44]). Some adopt different specifications to check the same
value-flow property (e.g., double free [12, 40]).
Preliminaries. As existing works [32, 40, 44], we assume that
the code in a program is in static single assignment (SSA) form,
where every variable has only one definition [18]. Also, we say the
value of a variable a flows to a variable b (or b is data-dependent
on a) if a is assigned to b directly (via assignments, such as b=a)
or indirectly (via pointer dereferences, such as *p=a; q=p; b=*q).
Thus, a value-flow graph can be defined as a directed graph where
the vertices are values in the program and the edges represent the
value-flow relations. A path is called value-flow path if it is a path
on the value-flow graph.
Property Specification. As defined below, we model a value-
flow property as an aggregation of value-flow paths.
Definition 3.1 (Value-Flow Property). A value-flow property, x , is
a quadruple: prop x := (src; sink; psc; agg), where
• src and sink are two pattern expressions (Table 1) that specify
the source and sink values of the value-flow paths to track.
• psc is the property-specific constraint that every value on
the value-flow path needs to satisfy.
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Table 1: Pattern expressions used in the specification
p ::= :: patterns
| p1, p2, · · · :: pattern list
| v0 = sig(v1, v2, · · · ) :: call
| v0 = ∗v1 :: load
| ∗v0 = v1 :: store
| v0 = v1 :: assign
| glob :: globals
v ::= :: symbol
| sig :: character string
| _ :: uninterested value
Examples:
v = malloc(_) ret values of any state-
ment calling malloc;
_ = send(_, v, _, _) the 2nd arg of any sta-
tement calling send;
_ = ∗v dereferenced values at
every load statement;
• agg ∈ {never,must, never-sim, · · · } is an extensible predi-
cate that determines how to aggregate value-flow paths to
check the specified property.
In practice, we can use the quadruple to specify a wide range of
value-flow properties. As discussed below, we put the properties
into three categories, which are checked by aggregating a single,
two, or more value-flow paths, respectively.
Null-Dereference-Like Bugs. Many program properties can
be checked using a single value-flow path, such as null-deref and
free-glob-ptr defined in Section 2.2, as well as a broad range of taint
issues that propagate a tainted object to a program point consuming
the object [22].
Double-Free-Like Bugs. Awide range of bugs happen in a pro-
gram execution because two program statements (e.g., two state-
ments calling function free) consecutively operate on the same
value (e.g., a heap pointer). Typical examples include use-after-free
which is a general form of double free, as well as bugs that operate
on expired resources such as using a closed file descriptor. As an
example, the specification of double-free can be specified as
prop double-free := (v = malloc(_); free(v);v , 0; never-sim)
In the specification, the property-specific constraint v , 0 re-
quires the initial value (or equivalently, all values) on the value-flow
path is a valid heap pointer. This is because v = 0 means malloc()
fails to allocate memory but returns a null pointer. In this case,
the free operation is harmless. The aggregate predicate “never-sim”
means that the value-flow paths from the same pointer should never
occur simultaneously. In other words, there is no control-flow path
that goes through two different free operations on the same heap
pointer. Otherwise, a double-free bug exists.
In Figure 3, for the two value-flow paths from p to the two free
operations, we can check (γ1 ∧ γ2) ∧ (γ1 ∧ γ4) ∧ (p , 0) to check
double-free bugs. Here, (γ1∧γ2) and (γ1∧γ4) are the path conditions
of the two paths, respectively.
Memory-Leak-Like Bugs.Many bugs happen because a value
(e.g., a heap pointer) must be properly handled (e.g., freed by calling
function free) in any program execution but, unfortunately, not.
Input: the value-flow graph of a progam to check
Input: a set of value-flow properties to check
Output: paths between sources and sinks for each property
foreach property in the input property set do
foreach source v in its source set do
while visit v ′ in the depth-first search from v do
if psc cannot be satisfied then
stop the search from v ′;
end
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: The naïve static analyzer.
Typical examples include all kinds of resource leaks such as file
descriptor leak, internet socket leak, etc. As an example, we write
the following specification for checking memory leaks:
prop mem-leak := (v = malloc(_); free(v);v , 0;must)
Compared to double-free, the only difference is the aggregate
predicate. The aggregate predicate “must” means that the value-
flow path from a heap pointer must be able to reach a free operation.
Otherwise, a memory leak exists in the program.
In Figure 3, for the two value-flow paths from p to the two free
operations, we can check the disjunction of their path conditions,
i.e., ¬((γ1 ∧γ2) ∨ (γ1 ∧γ4)) ∧γ1 ∧ (p , 0) to determine if a memory
leak exists. Here, (γ1 ∧ γ2) and (γ1 ∧ γ4) are the path conditions of
the two paths, respectively. The additional γ1 is the condition on
which the heap pointer is created.
4 INTER-PROPERTY-AWARE ANALYSIS
Given multiple value-flow properties specified as the quadruple
(src; sink; psc; agg), our inter-property-aware static analyzer then
starts to check them by searching value-flow paths and finally
checking bugs based on the agg predicate. Since the path aggregate
step is easy to run in parallel by independently checking all possible
path groups, it is not the performance bottleneck. In this paper, we
concentrate on how to exploit mutual synergies among different
properties to improve the efficiency of searching value-flow paths.
4.1 A Naïve Static Analyzer
For multiple value-flow properties, a naïve static analyzer checks
them independently in a demand-driven manner. As illustrated
in Algorithm 1, for each value-flow property, the static analyzer
traverses the value-flow graph from each of the source vertices. At
each step of the graph traversal, we check if psc can be satisfied with
regard to the current path condition. If not, we can stop the graph
traversal along the current path to save computing resources. This
path-pruning process is illustrated in the shaded part of Algorithm 1,
which is a critical factor to improve the analysis performance.
We observe that the properties to check usually have overlaps
and inconsistencies and, thus, are not necessary to be checked
independently as the naïve approach. Instead, we can exploit the
overlaps and inconsistencies to facilitate the path-pruning process
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in Algorithm 1, thus improving the analysis efficiency. In what
follows, we detail how the mutual synergies are utilized.
4.2 Optimized Intra-procedural Analysis
Based on the input property specifications, the core static analysis
engine makes two plans for traversing the value-flow graph. The
first is the optimization plan, which aims to prune more paths than
the naïve approach. The second is the graph traversal plan, which
concerns how to share paths among properties rather than prune
paths. As a whole, all the plans are summarized in Table 2. Each
row of the table is a rule describing what plan we can make on
certain preconditions and what benefits we can obtain from the
plan. To be clear, in this section, we detail the plans in the context
of scanning a single-procedure program. In the next subsection, we
introduce the inter-procedural analysis.
4.2.1 Optimization Plan. Based on the property specifications,
we adopt several strategies to facilitate the path pruning (Rules 1 –
4 in Table 2).
Ordering the Properties (Rule 1). Given a set of properties
with different source values, we need to determine the order in
which they are checked. Generally, there is no perfect order that
can guarantee the best optimization results. However, we observe
that a random order could significantly affect how many paths we
can prune in practice.
Let us consider the example in Figure 3 again. In Section 2.2, we
have explained that if free-glob-ptr is checked before null-deref, we
can prune the two paths from b and d when checking null-deref.
However, if we change the checking order, i.e., check null-deref
before free-glob-ptr, we can only prune one path from c . In detail,
when checking null-deref, the core engine records that c cannot
reach any sinks of free-glob-ptr. In this case, we can prune the path
from c when checking free-glob-ptr.
Intuitively, what makes the number of pruned paths different
is that the number of free operations is more than dereference
operations in the value-flow graph. That is, the more sink vertices
in the value-flow graph, the fewer paths we can prune for the
property. Inspired by this intuition and the example, the order of
property checking is arranged according to the number of sink
vertices. That is, the more sink vertices in the value-flow graph, the
earlier we check this property.
Recording Sink-Reachability (Rule 2). Given a set of proper-
ties {prop1, prop2, · · · }, the basic idea is that, when checking propi
by traversing the value-flow graph, the core engine needs to record
whether each visited vertex may reach a sink vertex of propj (j , i).
With the recorded information, when checking propj (j , i) and
visiting a vertex that cannot reach any of its sinks, the path from
the vertex can be pruned. Section 2.2 illustrates the method.
Recording the psc-Check Results (Rules 3 & 4). Given a
set of properties {prop1, prop2, · · · }, the basic idea is that, when
checking propi by traversing the value-flow graph, the core engine
needs to record whether some path segments (or a set of edges)
conflict with the property-specific constraint pscj of propj (j , i).
With the recorded information, when checking propj (j , i) and
visiting the path segments that do not satisfy its specific constraint,
the path with this segment can be pruned.
Let us consider the running example in Figure 3 again and assume
that γ3 is a , 0. When traversing the graph from empty_str to check
free-glob-ptr, the core engine needs to record that the edge from a
to c (whose condition is γ3, i.e., a , 0) conflicts with the property-
specific constraint of null-deref (i.e., a = 0). With this information,
when checking null-deref by traversing the graph from p, we can
also prune the path from the edge.
In practice, although the property-specific constraints are usually
simple, the path constraints, e.g., γ3 in the above example, are usu-
ally very sophisticated. Fortunately, thanks to the advances in the
area of clause learning [6], we are able to efficiently compute some
reusable facts when using SMT solvers to check path conditions
and property-specific constraints. Specifically, we compute two
reusable facts when a property-specific constraint psci conflicts
with the current path condition pc.
When pc ∧ psci is unsatisfiable, we can record the unsatisfi-
able core [23], which is a set of Boolean predicates from pc, e.g.,
{γ1,γ2, · · · }, such that γ1 ∧ γ2 ∧ · · · ∧ psci = false. Since pc is the
conjunction of the edge constraints on the value-flow path, each γi
corresponds to the condition of an edge ϵi on the value-flow graph.
Thus, we can record an edge set {ϵ1, ϵ2, · · · }, which conflicts with
psci . When checking the other property with the same property-
specific constraint, if a value-flow path goes through these recorded
edges, we can prune the remaining paths.
In addition to the unsatisfiable cores, we also can record the in-
terpolation constraints [14], which are even reusable for properties
with a different property-specific constraint. In the above example,
assume that psci is a = 0 and {γ1,γ2, · · · } is {a + b > 3,b < 0}.
During the constraint solving, an SMT solver can refute the satisfi-
ability of (a + b > 3) ∧ (b < 0) ∧ (a = 0) by finding an interpolant
γ ′ such that (a + b > 3) ∧ (b < 0) ⇒ γ ′ but γ ′ ⇏ (a = 0). In
the example, the interpolant γ ′ is a > 3, which provides a detailed
explanation why the γ set conflicts with a = 0. In addition, the
interpolant also indicates that the γ set conflicts with many other
constraints like a < 0, a < 3, etc. Thus, given a property whose
specific constraint conflicts with the interpolation constraint, it is
sufficient to conclude that any value-flow path passing through the
edge set can be pruned.
4.2.2 Graph Traversal Plan. Different from the optimization
plan that aims to prune paths, the graph traversal plan is to provide
strategies to share paths among different properties.
Merging theGraphTraversal (Rule 5).Weobserve that many
properties actually share the same or a part of source vertices and
even the same sink vertices. If the core engine checks each property
one by one, it will inevitably repeat traversing the graph from a
source vertex for different properties. To avoid such repetitive graph
traversal from the same source, we propose the graph traversal plan
to merge the path searching processes for different properties.
As an example, in Figure 3, since p may be a heap pointer or null,
checking both null-deref and mem-leak needs to traverse the graph
from p. Figure 4 illustrates how the merged traversal is performed.
That is, we maintain a property set during the graph traversal to
record what properties the current path contributes to. Whenever
visiting a vertex, we check if a property needs to be removed from
the property set. For instance, at the vertex d , we may be able to
remove null-deref from the property set if we can determine d
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Table 2: Rules of Making Analysis Plans for a Pair of Properties
Optimization Plans
prop x := (src1; sink1; psc1; agg1) and prop y := (src2; sink2; psc2; agg2), src1 , src2
ID Rule Name Precondition Plan Benefit
1 property ordering #sink1 > #sink2 check x before y more chances to prune paths
2
result recording
check x before y record vertices that cannot reach sink2 prune paths at a vertex
3 check x before y, psc1 = psc2 record unsat cores that conflict with psc2 prune paths if going through
4 check x before y, psc1 , psc2 record interpolants that conflict with psc2 a set of edges
Graph Traversal Plans
prop x := (src1; sink1; psc1; agg1) and prop y := (src2; sink2; psc2; agg2), src1 = src2
ID Rule Name Precondition Plan Benefit
5 traversal merging - search from src1 for both properties sharing path conditions
6
psc-check ordering
psc1 ∧ psc2 = psc1 check psc1 first if satisfiable, so is psc2
7 psc1 ∧ psc2 , false check psc1 ∧ psc2
if satisfiable, both psc1 and
psc2 can be satisfied
8 psc1 ∧ psc2 = false check any, e.g., psc1, first
if unsatisfiable, psc2 can be
satisfied
d
p
a
free(d)
empty_str
// heap or null
// pointer
free(b)
b
print(*c)
c
{mem-leak, null-deref}
{mem-leak, null-deref}
{mem-leak, null-deref}
{mem-leak}
psc: a≠0    psc: a=0
{mem-leak, null-deref}
{null-deref}
Figure 4: Merging the graph traversal.
cannot reach any dereference operation. When the property set
becomes empty at a vertex, the graph traversal stops immediately.
Ordering the psc-Checks (Rules 6 – 8). Since the graph tra-
versals are merged for different properties, at a vertex, e.g., a in
Figure 4, we have to check multiple property-specific constraints,
e.g., a , 0 for mem-leak and a = 0 for null-deref. Thus, a problem
we need to address is to determine the order in which the property-
specific constraints are checked. Since checking such constraints
often needs expensive SMT solving procedures, the order of such
constraint solving affects the analysis performance.
Given two property-specific constraints psc1 and psc2 as well as
the current path condition pc, we consider three cases, i.e., psc1 ∧
psc2 = psc1, psc1 ∧ psc2 , false, and psc1 ∧ psc2 = false, as listed
in Table 2. Since property-specific constraints are usually simple,
the above relations between psc1 and psc2 are easy to compute.
First, if psc1∧psc2 = psc1, it means that the solution of psc1 also
satisfies psc2. Thus, we check pc ∧ psc1 first. If it is satisfiable, we
can confirm that pc∧psc2 must be satisfiable without an expensive
SMT solving procedure.
Second, if psc1∧psc2 , false, it means that there exists a solution
that satisfying both psc1 and psc2. In this case, we check pc ∧
psc1 ∧ psc2 first, if it is satisfiable, we can confirm both pc ∧ psc1
and pc ∧ psc2 can be satisfied without additional SMT solving
procedures. In our experience, this strategy saves a lot of resources.
Third, if psc1∧psc2 = false, it means that there does not exist any
solution that satisfies both psc1 and psc2. In this case, we check any,
e.g., pc∧psc1, first. If the current path is feasible but pc∧psc1 is not
satisfiable, we can confirm that pc ∧ psc2 can be satisfied without
invoking SMT solvers. This case was illustrated in Figure 1b.
4.3 Modular Inter-procedural Analysis
Scalable program analyses work by exploiting the modular struc-
ture of programs. Almost every inter-procedural analysis builds
summaries for functions and reuses the function summary at its
calling contexts, in order to scale to large programs [16, 47]. In
Catapult, we can seamlessly extend our optimized intra-procedural
analysis to modular inter-procedural analysis by exploring the local
value-flow graph of each function and then stitching the local paths
together to generate complete value-flow paths. In the following,
we explain our design of the function summaries.
In our analysis, for each function, we build three kinds of value-
flow paths as the function summaries. They are defined as below
and, in Appendices A and B, we formally prove the sufficiency to
generate these function summaries. Intuitively, these summaries de-
scribe how function boundaries (i.e., formal parameters and return
values) partition a complete value-flow path. Using the property
double-free as an example, a complete value-flow path from p to
free(b) in Figure 5 is partitioned to a sub-path from p to ret p by
the boundary of xmalloc(). This sub-path is an output summary of
xmalloc() as defined below.
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vo id* xmal loc() {
vo id* p = mal loc(…);
return p;
}
vo id* xfree(vo id* u) {
free(u) ;
return u;
}
vo id main() {
vo id* a = xmal loc() ;
vo id* b = xfree(a) ;
i f (…) free(b) ;
return;
}
p
ret p
ret u
a
u
free(u)
b
free(b)
xmalloc
xfree
Figure 5: An example to show the inter-procedural analysis.
Definition 4.1 (Transfer Summary). Given a function f, a transfer
summary of f is a value-flow path from one of its formal parameters
to one of its return values.
Definition 4.2 (Input Summary). Given a function f, an input
summary of f is a value-flow path from one of its formal parameters
to a sink value in f or in the callees of f.
Definition 4.3 (Output Summary). Given a function f, an output
summary of f is a value-flow path from a source value to one of
f ’s return values. The source value is in f or in the callees of f.
After generating the function summaries, to avoid separately
storing them for different properties, each function summary is
labeled with a bit vector to record what properties it is built for.
Assume that we need to check null-deref, double-free, and mem-
leak in Figure 5. The three properties are assigned with three bit
vectors 0b001, 0b010, and 0b100 as their identities, respectively. As
explained before, all three properties regard p as the source vertex.
The sink vertices for checking double-free and mem-leak are free(b)
and free(u). There are no sink vertices for null-deref. According to
Definitions 4.1–4.3, we generate the following function summaries:
Function Summary Path Label Type
xmalloc (p, ret p) 0b111 transfer
xfree (u, ret u) 0b111 input(u, free(u)) 0b110 output
The summary (p, ret p) is labeled with 0b111 because all three
properties regard p as the source. The summary (u, ret u) is also
labeled with 0b111 because the path does not contain any property-
specific vertices and, thus, may be used for all three properties. The
summary (u, free(u)) is only labeled with 0b110 because we do not
regard free(u) as the sink for null-deref.
When analyzing the main function, we concatenate its intra-
procedural paths with summaries from the callee functions so as
to generate a complete path. For example, a concatenation is illus-
trated as below and its result is labeled by 0b110, meaning that the
resulting path only works for double-free and mem-leak.
(p, ret p)0b111 ◦ (a) ◦ (u, free(u))0b110
= (p, ret p,a,u, free(u))0b111&0b110
= (p, ret p,a,u, free(u))0b110
We observe that using value-flow paths as function summaries
has a significant advantage for checking multiple properties. That
is, since value flow is a kind of fundamental program relations,
it can be reused across different properties. This is different from
existing approaches that utilize state machine to model properties
and generate state-specific function summaries [19, 26]. Since dif-
ferent properties usually have different states, compared to our
value-flow-based function summaries, such state-specific function
summaries have fewer opportunities to be reused across properties.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the implementation details as well as
the properties to check in our framework.
Path-sensitivity.We have implemented our approach as a pro-
totype tool calledCatapult on top of Pinpoint [40]. Given the source
code of a program, we first compile it to LLVM bitcode,6 on which
our analysis is performed. To achieve path-sensitivity, we build
a path-sensitive value-flow graph and compute path conditions
following the same method of Pinpoint. The path conditions in our
analysis are first-order logic formulas over bit vectors. A program
variable is modeled as a bit vector, of which the length is the bit
width (e.g., 32) of the variable’s type (e.g., int). The path conditions
are solved by Z3 [20], a state-of-the-art SMT solver, to determine
path feasibility.
Properties to check. Catapult currently supports to check
twenty C/C++ properties defined in CSA, which are briefly in-
troduced in Table 3.7 The twenty properties include all CSA’s de-
fault C/C++ value-flow properties. All other default C/C++ prop-
erties in CSA but not in Catapult are simple ones that do not re-
quire a path-sensitive analysis. For example, the property secu-
rity.insecureAPI.bcopy requires CSA report a warning whenever a
program statement calling the function bcopy() is found.
Parallelization. Our analysis is performed in a bottom-up man-
ner, in which a callee function is always analyzed before its callers.
Bottom-up compositional analysis is easy to run in parallel [47].
Our special design for checking multiple properties does not pre-
vent our analysis from parallelization. As is common practice, in
Catapult, functions that do not have calling relations are analyzed
in parallel.
Soundness.We implement Catapult in a soundy manner [34].
This means that the implementation soundly handles most language
features and, meanwhile, includes some well-known unsound de-
sign decisions as previous works [4, 12, 40, 44, 47]. For example, in
our implementation, virtual functions are resolved by classic class
hierarchy analysis [21]. However, we do not handle C style function
pointers, inline assembly, and library functions. We also follow the
common practice to assume distinct function parameters do not
6LLVM: https://llvm.org/
7More details of the properties can be found on https://clang-analyzer.llvm.org/.
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Table 3: Properties to Check in Catapult
ID Property Name Brief Description
1 core.CallAndMessage Check for uninitialized arguments and null function pointers
2 core.DivideByZero Check for division by zero
3 core.NonNullParamChecker Check for null passed to function parameters marked with nonnull
4 core.NullDereference Check for null pointer dereference
5 core.StackAddressEscape Check that addresses of stack memory do not escape the function
6 core.UndefinedBinaryOperatorResult Check for the undefined results of binary operations
7 core.VLASize (Variable-Length Array) Check for declaration of VLA of undefined or zero size
8 core.uninitialized.ArraySubscript Check for uninitialized values used as array subscripts
9 core.uninitialized.Assign Check for assigning uninitialized values
10 core.uninitialized.Branch Check for uninitialized values used as branch conditions
11 core.uninitialized.CapturedBlockVariable Check for blocks that capture uninitialized values
12 core.uninitialized.UndefReturn Check for uninitialized values being returned to callers
13 cplusplus.NewDelete Check for C++ use-after-free
14 cplusplus.NewDeleteLeaks Check for C++ memory leaks
15 unix.Malloc Check for C memory leaks, double-free, and use-after-free
16 unix.MismatchedDeallocator Check for mismatched deallocators, e.g., new and free()
17 unix.cstring.NullArg Check for null pointers being passed to C string functions like strlen
18 alpha.core.CallAndMessageUnInitRefArg Check for uninitialized function arguments
19 alpha.unix.SimpleStream Check for misuses of C stream APIs, e.g., an opened file is not closed
20 alpha.unix.Stream Check stream handling functions, e.g., using a null file handle in fseek
Table 4: Subjects for Evaluation
ID Program Size (KLoC) ID Program Size (KLoC)
1 mcf 2 13 shadowsocks 32
2 bzip2 3 14 webassembly 75
3 gzip 6 15 transmission 88
4 parser 8 16 redis 101
5 vpr 11 17 imagemagick 358
6 crafty 13 18 python 434
7 twolf 18 19 glusterfs 481
8 eon 22 20 icu 537
9 gap 36 21 openssl 791
10 vortex 49 22 mysql 2,030
11 perlbmk 73
12 gcc 135 Total 5,303
alias each other [33] and unroll each cycle twice on the call graph
and the control flow graph. These unsound choices significantly
improve the scalability but have limited negative impacts on the
bug-finding capability.
6 EVALUATION
This section presents the systematic evaluation that demonstrates
the high scalability, precision, and recall of our approach.
6.1 Experimental Setup
To demonstrate the scalability of our approach, we compared the
time andmemory cost of Catapultwith a series of existing industrial-
strength static analyzers. We also investigated their capability of
finding real bugs, which confirms that our promising scalability is
not achieved by sacrificing its bug-finding capability.
Baseline approaches. First of all, we compared Catapult with
Pinpoint [40], an open-source version of the most recent static
analyzer of the same type. Both of the two techniques are demand-
driven, compositional, and sparse static analysis with the precision
of path-sensitivity. The difference is that Catapult exploits mutual
synergies among different properties to speed up the analysis while
Pinpoint does not. In addition, we also conducted comparison exper-
iments on the tools using abductive inference (Infer) and symbolic
execution (CSA), both of which are open source and widely-used
in industry. This comparison aims to show that Catapult is com-
petitive, as it consumes similar time and memory cost with CSA
and Infer, but is much more precise. In the experiments, all tools
were run with fifteen threads to take advantage of parallelization.
We also tried to compare with other static bug detection tools
such as Saturn [47], Calysto [4], Semmle [3], Fortify, and Kloc-
work.8 However, they are either unavailable or not runnable on the
experimental environment we are able to set up. The open-source
static analyzer, FindBugs,9 is not included in our experiments be-
cause it only works for Java while we focus on the analysis of C/C++
programs. We do not compare with Tricoder [39], the static analysis
platform from Google. This is because the only C/C++ analyzer in
it is CSA, which has been included in our experiments.
Subjects for evaluation. To avoid possible biases on the bench-
mark programs, we include the standard and widely-used bench-
mark, SPEC CINT 200010 (ID = 1 ∼ 12 in Table 4), in our evaluation.
At the same time, in order to demonstrate the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of Catapult on real-world projects, we also include ten
industrial-sized open-source C/C++ projects (ID = 13 ∼ 22 in Table
4), of which the size ranges from a few thousand to two million
lines of code.
8Klocwork: https://www.roguewave.com/products-services/klocwork/
9Findbugs Static Analyzer: http://findbugs.sourceforge.net/
10SPEC CPU2000: https://www.spec.org/cpu2000/
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Environment. All experiments were performed on a server
with two Intel© Xeon© CPU E5-2698 v4 @ 2.20GHz (each has 20
cores) and 256GB RAM running Ubuntu-16.04.
6.2 Comparing with Static Analyzer of the
Same Type
We first compared Catapult with Pinpoint, the most recent static
analyzer of the same type. To demonstrate the power of the graph
traversal plan and the optimization plan separately, we also con-
figured our approach by disabling the optimization plan, which is
denoted as Catapult∗.
In this experiment, we performed the whole program analysis.
That is, we linked all compilation units in a project into a single
file so that the static analyzers can perform cross-file analysis. Be-
fore the analysis, both Pinpoint and Catapult need to build the
value-flow graph as the program intermediate representation. Since
Catapult is built on top of Pinpoint, the pre-processing time and
the size of value-flow graph are the same for both tools, which are
almost linear to the size of a program [40]. Typically, for MySQL,
a program with about two million lines of code, it takes twenty
minutes to build a value-flow graph with seventy million nodes
and ninety million edges. We omit the details of these data because
it is not the contribution of this paper.
Efficiency. The time and memory cost of checking each bench-
mark program is shown in Figure 6a. Owing to the inter-property-
awareness, Catapult is about 8× faster than Pinpoint and takes
only 1/7 memory usage on average. Typically, Catapult can finish
checking MySQL in 5 hours, which is aligned with the industrial
requirement of finishing an analysis in 5 to 10 hours [7, 35].
When the optimization plan is disabled, Catapult∗ is about 3.5×
faster than Pinpoint and takes 1/5 memory usage on average. Com-
pared to the result of Catapult, it implies that the graph traversal
plan and the optimization plan contribute to 40% and 60% of the
time cost reduction, respectively. Meanwhile, they contribute to
70% and 30% of the memory cost reduction, respectively. As a sum-
mary, the two plans contribute similar to the time cost reduction,
and the graph traversal plan is more important for the memory
cost reduction because it allows us to abundantly share analysis
results across different properties and avoid duplicate data storage.
Using the largest subject, MySQL, as an example, Figure 6b il-
lustrates the growth curves of the time and the memory overhead
when the properties in Table 3 are added into the core engine one
by one. As illustrated, in terms of both time and memory overhead,
Catapult grows much slower than Pinpoint and, thus, scales up
quite gracefully.
It is noteworthy that, except for the feature of inter-property-
awareness, Catapult follows the same method of Pinpoint to build
value-flow graph and perform path-sensitive analysis. Thus, they
have similar performance to check a single property. Catapult
performs better than Pinpoint only when multiple properties are
checked together.
Effectiveness. Since bothCatapult and Pinpoint are inter-proce-
durally path-sensitive, as shown in Table 5-Left, they produce a
similar number of bug reports (# Rep) and false positives (# FP) for
all the real-world programs except for the programs that Pinpoint
fails to analyze due to the out-of-memory exception.
6.3 Comparing with Other Static Analyzers
To better understand the performance of Catapult in comparison
to other types of property-unaware static analyzers, we also ran
Catapult against two prominent and mature static analyzers, CSA
(based on symbolic execution) and Infer (based on abductive in-
ference). Note that Infer does not classify the properties to check
as Table 3 but targets at a similar range of properties, such as null
dereference, memory leak, etc.
In the evaluation,CSAwas run with two different configurations:
one is its default configuration where a fast but imprecise range-
based solver is employed to solve path constraints, and the other
uses Z3 [20], a full-featured SMT solver, to solve path constraints.
To ease the explanation, we denote CSA in the two configurations
as CSA (Default) and CSA (Z3), respectively. Since CSA separately
analyzes each source file and Infer only has limited capability of
detecting cross-file bugs, for a fair comparison, all tools in the ex-
periments were configured to check source files separately, and the
time limit for analyzing each file is set to 60 minutes. Since a single
source file is usually small, we did not encounter memory issues
in the experiment but missed a lot of cross-file bugs as discussed
later. Also, since we build value-flow graphs separately for each
file and do not need to track cross-file value flows, the time cost
of building value-flow graphs is almost negligible. Typically, for
MySQL, it takes about five minutes to build value-flow graphs for
all files. This time cost is included in the results discussed below.
Note that we did not change other default configurations of
CSA and Infer. This is because the default configuration is usually
the best in practice. Modifying their default configuration may
introduce more biases.
Efficiency (Catapult vs. CSA (Z3)).When both Catapult and
CSA employ Z3 to solve path constraints, they have similar preci-
sion (i.e., full path-sensitivity) in theory. However, as illustrated in
Figure 6c, Catapult is much faster than CSA and consumes similar
memory for all the subjects. For example, for MySQL, it takes about
36 hours for CSA to finish the analysis while Catapult takes only
half an hour but consumes similar memory space. On average, Cat-
apult is 68× faster than CSA at the cost of only 2× more memory
to generate and store summaries. In spite of the 2× more memory,
both of them can finish the analysis in 12GB memory, which is
affordable using a common personal computer.
Efficiency (Catapult vs. CSA (Default) and Infer). As illus-
trated in Figure 6c, compared to Infer and the default version of CSA,
Catapult takes similar (sometimes, a little higher) time and memory
cost to check the subject programs. For instance, for MySQL, the
largest subject program, all three tools finish the analysis in 40
minutes and consume about 10GB memory. With similar efficiency,
Catapult, as a fully path-sensitive analysis, is much more precise
than the other two. The lower precision of CSA and Infer leads to
many false positives as discussed below.
Effectiveness. In addition to the efficiency, we also investigate
the bug-finding capability of the tools. Table 5-Right presents the
results. Since we only perform file-level analysis in this experiment,
the bugs reported by Catapult is much fewer than those in Table 5-
Left. Since validating each report may take tens of minutes, one day,
or even longer, we could not afford the time to manually inspect
all of them. Thus, we randomly sampled a hundred reports for the
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Figure 6: (a) Comparing time and memory cost with Pinpoint. (b) The growth curves of the time and the memory overhead
when comparing to Pinpoint. (c) Comparing time and memory cost with CSA and Infer.
Table 5: Effectiveness (Catapult vs. Pinpoint, CSA, and Infer)
Program Catapult Pinpoint# Rep # FP # Rep # FP
shadowsocks 9 0 9 0
webassembly 10 2 10 2
transmission 24 2 24 2
redis 39 5 39 5
imagemagick 26 8 - -
python 48 7 48 7
glusterfs 59 22 59 22
icu 161 31 - -
openssl 48 15 - -
mysql 245 88 - -
% FP 26.9% 20.1%
Program Catapult CSA (Z3) CSA (Default) Infer
†
# Rep # FP # Rep # FP # Rep # FP # Rep # FP
shadowsocks 8 2 24 22 25 23 15 13
webassembly 4 0 1 0 6 2 12 12
transmission 31 10 17 12 26 21 167* 82
redis 19 6 15 7 32 20 16 7
imagemagick 24 7 34 21 78 61 34 18
python 37 7 62 40 149* 77 82 63
glusterfs 28 5 0 0 268* 82 - -
icu 55 11 94 67 206* 69 248* 71
openssl 39 19 44 26 44 26 211* 85
mysql 59 20 271* 59 1001* 79 258* 80
% FP 28.6% 64.9% 75.7% 78.6%
* We inspected one hundred randomly-sampled bug reports.
†We fail to run the tool on glusterfs.
projects that have more than one hundred reports. We can observe
from the results that, on average, the false positive rate of Catapult
is much lower than CSA and Infer. In terms of recall, Catapult
reports more true positives, which cover all those reported by CSA
and Infer. CSA and Infer miss many bugs because they make some
trade-offs in exchange for efficiency. For example, CSA often stops
its analysis on a path after it finds the first possible bug.
Together with the results on efficiency, we can conclude that
Catapult is much more scalable than CSA and Infer because they
have similar time and memory overhead but Catapult is much more
precise and able to detect more bugs.
6.4 Detected Real Bugs
We note that the real-world software used in our evaluation is fre-
quently scanned by commercial tools such as Coverity SAVE11 and,
11Coverity Scan: https://scan.coverity.com/projects/
thus, is expected to have very high quality. Nevertheless, Catapult
still can detect many deeply-hidden software bugs that existing
static analyzers, such as Pinpoint, CSA, and Infer, cannot detect.
At the time of writing, thirty-nine previously-unknown bugs
have been confirmed and fixed by the software developers, in-
cluding seventeen null pointer dereferences, ten use-after-free or
double-free bugs, eleven resource leaks, and one stack-address-
escape bug. Four of them even have been assigned CVE IDs due
to their security impact. We have made an online list for all bugs
assigned CVE IDs or fixed by their original developers.12
As an example, Figure 7 presents a null-deference bug detected by
Catapult in ImageMagick, which is a software suite for processing
images. This bug is of high complexity, as it occurs in a function of
more than 1,000 lines of code and the control flow involved in the
bug spans across 56 functions over 9 files.
12Detected real bugs: https://qingkaishi.github.io/catapult.html
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ResampleFilter **AcquireResampleFilterThreadSet(...) {
…
if (…)
return ((ResampleFilter **) NULL);
…
}
Image *DistortImage(...) { // >1, 000 lines of code
…
resample_filter=AcquireResampleFilterThreadSet(...);
…
switch (method) {
case AffineDistortion:
ScaleFilter(resample_filter[id], ...)
…
}
…
}
Location: MagickCore/resample-private.h
Location: MagickCore/distort.c
A null pointer is returned if 
some condition is satisfied.
Get the null pointer from the 
callee function.
The null pointer is dereferenced 
after a long propagation
Figure 7: A null-dereference bug in ImageMagick.
Since both CSA and Infer make many unsound trade-offs to
achieve scalability, neither of them detects this bug. Pinpoint also
cannot detect the bug because it is not memory-efficient and has to
give up its analysis after the memory is exhausted.
7 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, a very limited number of existing
static analyses have studied how to statically check multiple pro-
gram properties at once, although the problem is very important at
an industrial setting. Goldberg et al. [27] make unsound assump-
tions and intentionally stop the analysis on a path after finding the
first bug. Apparently, the approach will miss many bugs, which
violates our design goal. Different from our approach that reduces
unnecessary program exploration via cross-property optimization,
Mordan and Mutilin [36] studied how to distribute computing re-
sources, so that the resources are not exhausted by a few properties.
Cabodi and Nocco [9] studied the problem of checking multiple
properties in the context of hardwaremodel checking. Their method
has a similar spirit to our approach as it also tries to exploit mutual
synergies among different properties. However, it works in a dif-
ferent manner specially designed for hardware. In order to avoid
state-space explosion caused by large sets of properties, some other
approaches studied how to decompose a set of properties into small
groups [1, 10]. Owing to the decomposition, we cannot share the
analysis results across different groups. There are also some static
analyzers such as Semmle [3] and DOOP [8] that take advantage
of datalog engines for multi-query optimization. However, they
are usually not path-sensitive and their optimization methods are
closely related to the sophisticated datalog specifications. In this
paper, we focus on value-flow queries that can be simply specified
as a quadruple and, thus, cannot benefit from the datalog engines.
CSA and Infer currently are two of the most famous open-source
static analyzerswith industrial strength.CSA is a symbolic-execution-
based, exhaustive, and whole-program static analyzer. As a sym-
bolic execution, it suffers from the path-explosion problem [30]. To
be scalable, it has to make unsound assumptions as in the afore-
mentioned related work [27], limit its capability of detecting cross-
file bugs, and give up full path-sensitivity by default. Infer is an
abstract-interpretation-based, exhaustive, and compositional static
analyzer. To be scalable, it also makes many trade-offs: giving up
path-sensitivity and discarding sophisticated pointer analysis in
most cases. Similarly, Tricoder, the analyzer in Google, only works
intra-procedurally in order to analyze large code base [38, 39].
In the past decades, researchers have proposed many general
techniques that can check different program properties but do not
consider how to efficiently check them together [4, 5, 11, 13, 15,
24, 25, 28, 37, 40, 43, 47]. Thus, we study different problems. In
addition, there are also many techniques tailored only for a spe-
cial program property, including null dereference [33], use after
free [48], memory leak [12, 26, 44, 46], buffer overflow [31], etc.
Since we focus on the extensional scalability issue for multiple
properties, our approach is different from them.
Value flow properties checked in our static analyzer are also
related to well-known type-state properties [41, 42]. Generally, we
can regard a value-flow property as a type-state property with at
most two states. Nevertheless, value-flow properties have covered
a wide range of program issues. Thus, a scalable value-flow ana-
lyzer is really necessary and useful in practice. Modeling a program
issue as a value-flow property has many advantages. For instance,
Cherem et al. [12] pointed out that we can utilize the sparseness
of value-flow graph to avoid tracking unnecessary value propaga-
tion in a control flow graph, thereby achieving better performance
and outputting more concise issue reports. In this paper, we also
demonstrate that using the value-flow-based model enables us to
mitigate the extensional scalability issue.
8 CONCLUSION
We have presented Catapult, a scalable approach to checking mul-
tiple value-flow properties together. The critical factor that makes
our technique fast is to exploit the mutual synergies among the
properties to check. Since the number of program properties to
check is quickly increasing nowadays, we believe that it will be
an important research direction to study how to scale up static
program analysis for simultaneously checking multiple properties.
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A A CONTEXT-FREE GRAMMAR MODEL
With no loss of generality, we assume the code in each function is in SSA form, where every variable has only one definition [17]. In a
program, as existing work [32, 40, 44], we say the value of a variable a flows to a variable b (or b is data-dependent on a) if a is assigned to b
directly (via an assignment, such as b=a) or indirectly (via pointer dereferences, such as *p=a; q=p; b=*q). Then, the value-flow graph of a
program is defined as below.
Definition A.1 (Value-Flow Graph). A value-flow graph is a directed graph G = (V ,E), where V and E are defined as following:
• V is a set of vertices, each of which is denoted by v@s , meaning that the variable v is defined or used in the statement s .
• E ⊆ V ×V is a set of edges, each of which represents a data dependence relation or value flow. (v1@s1,v2@s2) ∈ E means that the
value of v1@s1 flows to v2@s2.
We say π = (v0@s0,v1@s1, · · · ,vn@sn ) is a value-flow path if and only if the sequence represents a path on the value-flow graph. We
use π [i] to represent vi@li on the path if 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Specifically, we use π [−1] to represent the last element of π . A value-flow path π2 can be
concatenated to the other one π1, denoted as π1π2, if and only if (π1[−1],π2[0]) ∈ E. Given V1,V2,V3,V4 ⊆ V , we use Π(V1,V2) to represent
the set of value-flow paths from a vertex in V1 to a vertex in V2. The concatenation of two value-flow paths then can be extended to two sets:
Π(V1,V2)Π(V3,V4) = {π1π2 : π1 ∈ Π(V1,V2) ∧ π2 ∈ Π(V3,V4) ∧ (π1[−1],π2[0]) ∈ E}.
In the following definitions, we use Vfp,Vap,Vfr, and Var to represent four special vertex subsets. Vfp and Vap represent the sets of formal
and actual parameters, respectively. Vfr and Var represent the sets of formal and actual return values, respectively. We refer to the return
value at a return statement as the formal return value (e.g., v@return v) and the return value at a call statement as the actual return value
(e.g., v@v=func()). All proofs in this subsection are put in Appendix B.
Definition A.2 (Intra-Procedural Value-Flow Paths, ΠIP(Vi ,Vj )). Given a value-flow graph G = (V ,E) and Vi ,Vj ⊆ V , a value-flow path
π ∈ ΠIP(Vi ,Vj ) iff. π ∈ Π(Vi ,Vj ) and ∀m ≥ 0,n ≥ 0: π [m] and π [n] are in the same function.13
As defined below, a same-level value-flow path starts and ends in the same function, but may go through some callee functions.
Definition A.3 (Same-Level Value-Flow Paths, ΠSL(Vi ,Vj )). Given a value-flow graph G = (V ,E) and Vi ,Vj ⊆ V , a value-flow path
π ∈ ΠSL(Vi ,Vj ) iff. π ∈ Π(Vi ,Vj ) and π [0] is in the same function with π [−1].
Example A.4 (Same-Level Value-Flow Paths, ΠSL(Vi ,Vj )). The value-flow path (a@s10,u@s4, u@s6,b@s10) in Figure 8 is a same-level
value-flow path because the head of the path a@s10 is in the same function with the tail b@s10.
Lemma A.5 (Same-Level Value-Flow Paths, ΠSL(Vi ,Vj )). ΠSL(Vi ,Vj ) can be generated using the following productions:
ΠSL(Vi ,Vj ) → ΠIP(Vi ,Vj ) (1)
ΠSL(Vi ,Vj ) → ΠIP(Vi ,Vap)ΠSL(Vfp,Vfr)ΠSL(Var,Vj ) (2)
An output value-flow path, which is defined below, indicates that a checker-specific source escapes to its caller functions or upper-level
caller functions.
Definition A.6 (Output Value-Flow Paths, ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr)). Given a value-flow graph G = (V ,E), a value-flow path π ∈ ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr) iff.
π ∈ Π(Vsrc,Vfr) and π [−1] is in the same function with π [0] or in the (upper-level) callers of π [0]’s function.
Example A.7 (Output Value-Flow Paths, ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr)). In Figure 8, (p@s1,p@s2) is an output value-flow path, because the source vertex
p@s1 flows to p@s2, which is a formal return value and in the same function with p@s1.
Lemma A.8 (Output Value-Flow Paths, ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr)). ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr) can be generated using the following productions:
ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr) → ΠSL(Vsrc,Vfr) (3)
ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr) → ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr)ΠSL(Var,Vfr) (4)
An input value-flow path, as defined below, indicates that a formal parameter of a function f may flow to a sink vertex in f or f ’s callees.
A source vertex in f ’s caller functions may propagate to the sink through the formal parameter.
Definition A.9 (Input Value-Flow Paths, ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink)). Given a value-flow graph G = (V ,E), a value-flow path π ∈ ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink) iff.
π ∈ Π(Vfp,Vsink) and π [−1] is in the same function with π [0] or in the (lower-level) callees of π [0]’s function.
Example A.10 (Input Value-Flow Paths, ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink)). In Figure 8, (u@s4,u@s5) is an input value-flow path because it starts with a
formal parameter u@s4 and ends with a sink vertex u@s5 in the same function.
13 For simplicity, when we say v1@s1 and v2@s2 are in the same function, we mean that they are in the same function under the same calling context.
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s 0 vo id* xmal loc() {
s 1 vo id* p = mal loc(…);
s 2 return p;
s 3 }
s 4 vo id* xfree(vo id* u) {
s 5 free(u) ;
s 6 return u;
s 7 }
s 8 vo id main() {
s 9  vo id* a = xmal loc() ;
s 10 vo id* b = xfree(a) ;
s 11 i f (…) {
s 12 free(b) ;
s 13 }
s 14 return;
s 15 }
a@s9∊Var a@s10∊Vap
b@s12∊Vsinkp@s1∊Vsrc
p@s2∊Vfr u@s4∊Vfp u@s5 ∊Vsink
main xfreexmalloc
u@s6∊Vfrb@s10∊Var
Figure 8: Code and its value-flow graph for explaining Examples A.4 - A.10
Lemma A.11 (Input Value-Flow Paths, ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink)). ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink) can be generated using the following productions:
ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink) → ΠSL(Vfp,Vsink) (5)
ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink) → ΠSL(Vfp,Vap)ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink) (6)
Lemma A.12 (Target Value-Flow Paths, Π(Vsrc,Vsink)). Given a checker (Vsrc,Vsink,Fp ,Aq ), the set of target value-flow paths Π(Vsrc,Vsink)
can be generated using the following productions:
Π(Vsrc,Vsink) → ΠSL(Vsrc,Vsink) (7)
Π(Vsrc,Vsink) → ΠSL(Vsrc,Vap)ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink) (8)
Π(Vsrc,Vsink) → ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr)ΠSL(Var,Vsink) (9)
Π(Vsrc,Vsink) → ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr)ΠSL(Var,Vap)ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink) (10)
The context-free grammar (Productions (1) - (10)) implies that there is a Turing machine (or an algorithm) that can generate the target set
Π(Vsrc,Vsink) of value-flow paths by concatenating various value-flow paths [29], which sets the foundation for our compositional analysis.
According to the grammar, we can prove that, in the compositional analysis, it is sufficient to generate three kinds of function summaries,
i.e., value-flow paths in ΠSL(Vfp,Vfr), ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink), and ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr). The sufficiency is described as the following theorem and proved
in the appendices.
Theorem A.13 (Summary Sufficiency). Any target value-flow path in Π(Vsrc,Vsink) can be written as the concatenation of (1) a function’s
intra-procedural value-flow paths, and (2) value-flow paths in ΠSL(Vfp,Vfr), ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink), and ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr) from its callees.
B PROOFS
Given a global value-flow graphG = (V ,E), we now explain the proofs of the lemmas and theorems in the paper. To ease the explanation, we
usevsrc,vsink,vfp,vap,vfr andvar to represent elements in the setsVsrc,Vsink,Vfp,Vap,Vfr andVar, respectively. Sometimes we add superscript
to them, e.g., v0fp,v
1
fp, · · · , to represent a list of such elements with indices. In the proofs, when we say two elements in V are in the same
function, we mean they are in the same function as well as the same calling context.
Proof of Lemma A.5.
Proof.
(1) Prove: ΠSL(Vi ,Vj ) ⊇ ΠIP(Vi ,Vj ) ∪ ΠIP(Vi ,Vap)ΠSL(Vfp,Vfr)ΠSL(Var,Vj ).
First, according to Definitions A.2 and A.3, it is straightforward to conclude ∀π ∈ ΠIP(Vi ,Vj ) : π ∈ ΠSL(Vi ,Vj ).
Second, ∀π ∈ ΠIP(Vi ,Vap)ΠSL(Vfp,Vfr)ΠSL(Var,Vj ), π can be written as π1π2π3 where π1 ∈ ΠIP(Vi ,Vap), π2 ∈ ΠSL(Vfp,Vfr), and π3 ∈
ΠSL(Var,Vj ). Since π1[−1] is an actual parameter and π2[0] is a formal parameter, the concatenation of π1 and π2 means that we enter into a
callee function, say foo. Since the formal parameter π2[0] and the formal return value π2[−1] are in the same function, the concatenation of
π2 and π3 means that we exit from the callee foo. Thus, π1[−1] and π3[0] are actually the actual parameter and actual return value at the
same call site. Since π3 is a same-level path, π3[0] and π3[−1] are in the same function. Hence, π1[0] and π3[−1] is in the same function,
meaning that π = π1π2π3 ∈ ΠSL(Vi ,Vj ).
(2) Prove: ΠSL(Vi ,Vj ) ⊆ ΠIP(Vi ,Vj ) ∪ ΠIP(Vi ,Vap)ΠSL(Vfp,Vfr)ΠSL(Var,Vj ).
∀π ∈ ΠSL(Vi ,Vj ), π can be intra-procedural or inter-procedural. If it is an intra-procedural path, then π ∈ ΠIP(Vi ,Vj ).
For an inter-procedural path π ∈ ΠSL(Vi ,Vj ), since π [0] and π [−1] are in the same function, the value of π [0] must flow to the other
function, say foo, and, then, flow back. The function foo must be callee function because because if a value is returned to the caller function,
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it cannot flow back to the same function in the same calling context. Therefore, a path in ΠSL(Vi ,Vj ) must be in the following form, where
vi ∈ Vi ,vj ∈ Vj , the value flow (vpap,vp+1fp ) is a function call, and the value flow (v
p+1
fr ,v
p+2
ar ) is a function return, (p = 1, 2, · · · , 2n + 1).
(vi ...v1ap)︸     ︷︷     ︸
ΠIP(Vi ,Vap)
(v2fp...v2fr)︸     ︷︷     ︸
ΠSL(Vfp,Vfr)
(v3ar...v3ap)︸      ︷︷      ︸
ΠIP(Var,Vap)
(v4fp...v4fr)︸     ︷︷     ︸
ΠSL(Vfp,Vfr)
(v5ar...v5ap)︸      ︷︷      ︸
ΠIP(Var,Vap)
(v6fp...v6fr)︸     ︷︷     ︸
ΠSL(Vfp,Vfr)
· · · (v2n+1ar ...v2n+1ap )︸             ︷︷             ︸
ΠIP(Var,Vap)
(v2n+2fp ...v2n+2fr )︸             ︷︷             ︸
ΠSL(Vfp,Vfr)
(v2n+3ar ...vj )︸        ︷︷        ︸
ΠIP(Var,Vj )︸                                                                                                                    ︷︷                                                                                                                    ︸
ΠSL(Var,Vj )
Thus, if π ∈ ΠSL(Vi ,Vj ) is inter-procedural, π ∈ ΠIP(Vi ,Vap)ΠSL(Vfp,Vfr)ΠSL(Var,Vj ). □
Proof of Lemma A.8.
Proof.
(1) Prove: ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr) ⊇ ΠSL(Vsrc,Vfr) ∪ ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr)ΠSL(Var,Vfr)
First, according to Definitions A.3 and A.6, it is straightforward to conclude ∀π ∈ ΠSL(Vsrc,Vfr) : π ∈ ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr).
Second, ∀π ∈ ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr)ΠSL(Var,Vfr), it can be written as π1π2 where π1 ∈ ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr) and π2 ∈ ΠSL(Var,Vfr). Since π1[−1] is a
formal return value, the concatenation of π1 and π2 means a function return. Thus, π2 is in the caller function of the source value π1[0].
According to Definition A.6, π = π1π2 ∈ ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr).
(2) Prove: ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr) ⊆ ΠSL(Vsrc,Vfr) ∪ ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr)ΠSL(Var,Vfr)
According to Definition A.6, ∀π ∈ ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr), it must be in the form (vsrc, ...,vfr). And vfr is in the same function with vsrc or vfr is
in certain (direct or indirect) callers of vsrc. If vfr is in the same function with vsrc, it means π is a same-level path and, thus, is in the set
ΠSL(Vsrc,Vfr).
If vfr is in a caller function of vsrc, since a program state only can transit to its callers via function return, (vsrc, ...,vfr) can be split into
multiple parts concatenated by return value flows (vfr,var):
(vsrc...v0fr)︸      ︷︷      ︸
ΠSL(Vsrc,Vfr)
(v1ar...v1fr)︸     ︷︷     ︸
ΠSL(Var,Vfr)
(v2ar...v2fr)︸     ︷︷     ︸
ΠSL(Var,Vfr)
· · · (vnar...vnfr)︸     ︷︷     ︸
ΠSL(Var,Vfr)︸                                                      ︷︷                                                      ︸
ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr)
(vn+1ar ...vfr)︸        ︷︷        ︸
ΠSL(Var,Vfr)
Thus, ∀π = (vsrc, ...,vfr) ∈ ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr), if vfr is in a caller function of vsrc, π must be in the set ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr)ΠSL(Var,Vfr). □
Proof of Lemma A.11.
Proof.
(1) Prove: ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink) ⊇ ΠSL(Vfp,Vsink) ∪ ΠSL(Vfp,Vap)ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink)
First, according to Definitions A.3 and A.9, it is straightforward to conclude ∀π ∈ ΠSL(Vfp,Vsink) : π ∈ ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink).
Second, ∀π ∈ ΠSL(Vfp,Vap)ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink), it can be written as π1π2 where π1 ∈ ΠSL(Vfp,Vap) and π2 ∈ ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink). Since π1[−1] is an
actual parameter, the concatenation of π1 and π2 means a function call. Thus, π2 is in the callee function of the source value π1[0]. According
to Definition A.9, π = π1π2 ∈ ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink).
(2) Prove: ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink) ⊆ ΠSL(Vfp,Vsink) ∪ ΠSL(Vfp,Vap)ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink)
According to Definition A.9, ∀π ∈ ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink), π must be in the form (vfp, ...,vsink), where (1) vsink is in the same function with vfp or
(2) vsink is in certain (direct or indirect) callee of vfp. If vsink is in the same function with vfp, (Vfp...Vsink) ∈ ΠSL(Vfp,Vsink).
If Vsink is in some callee of Vfp, since a state only can transit to its callees via function calls, (Vfp...Vsink) can be split into multiple parts
concatenated by function-call value flows (vap,vfp):
(vfp...v0ap)︸      ︷︷      ︸
ΠSL(Vfp,Vap)
(v1fp...v1ap)︸      ︷︷      ︸
ΠSL(Vfp,Vap)
(v2fp...v2ap)︸      ︷︷      ︸
ΠSL(Vfp,Vap)
· · · (vnfp...vnap)︸      ︷︷      ︸
ΠSL(Vfp,Vap)
(vn+1fp ...vsink)︸           ︷︷           ︸
ΠSL(Vfp,Vap)︸                                                            ︷︷                                                            ︸
ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink)
Thus, ∀π = (vsrc, ...,vfr) ∈ ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink), if Vsink is in some callee of Vfp, π must be in the set ΠSL(Vfp,Vap)ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink). □
Proof of Lemma A.12.
Proof. To ease explanation, let us use RHS to represent the set of value-flow paths in the right-hand side of Productions (7)-(10).
(1) Prove: Π(Vfp,Vsink) ⊇ RHS
According to the definitions, it is straightforward to conclude that ∀π ∈ RHS : π ∈ Π(Vsrc,Vsink).
(2) Prove: Π(Vfp,Vsink) ⊆ RHS
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Given a target value-flow path π = (vsrc, ...,vsink), we search the path from v = vsink in reverse order until the last vertex π [i] satisfying
the searching condition: π [i] and v are in the same function and π [i] ∈ Vfp. If we find such a π [i], set σ = π [i − 1], which must be inVap, and
continue the search. Otherwise, we stop the search. Accordingly, we can rewrite the target value-flow path as below, where the arrows
indicate the searching process:
(vsrc...vnap,
←−−−−−−−−
vnfp...v
n−1
ap︸      ︷︷      ︸
ΠSL(Vfp,Vap)
......
←−−−−−−−−
v2fp...v
1
ap︸    ︷︷    ︸
ΠSL(Vfp,Vap)
,
←−−−−−−−−
v1fp...v
0
ap︸    ︷︷    ︸
ΠSL(Vfp,Vap)
,
←−−−−−−−−−−−
v0fp...vsink)︸       ︷︷       ︸
ΠSL(Vfp,V•sink )︸                                                               ︷︷                                                               ︸
ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink)
Case (1): If vsrc is in the same function with vnap, it can be written as below and, thus, we have Production (8).
(vsrc...vnap︸      ︷︷      ︸
ΠSL(Vsrc,Vap)
, vnfp...vsink)︸       ︷︷       ︸
ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink)
Case (2): If vsrc is not in the same function with vnap, vsrc must be in a callee of vnap, otherwise, it is contradicted with the assumption that
we stop the search at the vnfp. Since vsrc is in a callee of v
n
ap, the target value-flow path can be written as below. Thus, we have Production (9).
(vsrc...vfr︸     ︷︷     ︸
ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr)
, var...v
n
ap︸    ︷︷    ︸
ΠSL(Var,Vap
, vnfp...vsink)︸       ︷︷       ︸
ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink)
Case (3): During the search, if we never find any π [i] satisfying the searching condition and vsrc and vsink are in the same function.
According to Definition A.3, the target value-flow path is in ΠSL(Vsrc,Vsink). Thus, we have Production (7).
Case (4): During the search, if we never find any π [i] satisfying the searching condition and vsrc and vsink are in different functions,
similar to Case (2), vsrc must be in some callee of vsink. Thus, the target value-flow path can be rewritten as below and we get Production (10).
(vsrc...vfr︸     ︷︷     ︸
ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr)
, var...vsink)︸       ︷︷       ︸
ΠSL(Var,Vsink)
□
Proof of Theorem A.13.
Proof. A target value-flow path in Π(Vsrc,Vsink) generated by Production (7) can be rewritten according to the following two different
derivations, in which ∗ is the Kleene star operation and 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Π(Vsrc, Vsink) → ΠSL(Vsrc, Vap)ΠIN(Vfp, Vsink)
π1︸︷︷︸ π2︸︷︷︸
→ ΠIP(Vsrc, Vap)ΠIN(Vfp, Vsink)
Π(Vsrc, Vsink) → ΠSL(Vsrc, Vap)ΠIN(Vfp, Vsink)
→ ΠIP(Vsrc, Vap)ΠSL(Vfp, Vfr)ΠSL(Var, Vap)ΠIN(Vfp, Vsink)
→ ΠIP(Vsrc, Vap)ΠSL(Vfp, Vfr)(ΠIP(Var, Vap)ΠSL(Vfp, Vfr)) ∗ ΠSL(Var, Vap)ΠIN(Vfp, Vsink)
π1︸︷︷︸ π2︸︷︷︸ π2k+1︸︷︷︸ π2k+2︸︷︷︸ π2n+3︸︷︷︸ π ′︸︷︷︸
→ ΠIP(Vsrc, Vap)ΠSL(Vfp, Vfr)(ΠIP(Var, Vap)ΠSL(Vfp, Vfr)) ∗ ΠIP(Var, Vap)ΠIN(Vfp, Vsink)
In the first derivation, Production (1) is applied to the underline part and a target value-flow path π then can be rewritten as π1π2. Here, π1
is an intra-procedural path in a function and π2 must come from one of the function’s callees. This is because π1[−1] ∈ Vap and π2[0] ∈ Vfp,
which means that the value-flow (π1[−1],π2[0]) is a function call.
In the second derivation, Production (2) is applied multiple times to the underlined parts in the first two rows and, finally, Production
(1) is applied to the underlined part in the third row. Following this derivation, a target value-flow path is split into more parts where
any triple π2k−1π2kπ2k+1 means entering into a callee function (π2k−1[−1] ∈ Vap and π2k [0] ∈ Vfp) and returning back (π2k [−1] ∈ Vfr and
π2k+1[0] ∈ Var). Thus, all intra-procedural parts (i.e., π1 and all π2k+1) are in the same function and the other parts (i.e., π ′ and all π2k ) are
from callees.
Thus, based on Production (1), a target value-flow path can be rewritten as the concatenation of the intra-procedural paths of a function
and other paths in ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink) and ΠSL(Vfp,Vfr) from callees.
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In a similar manner, after analyzing Productions (8)-(10), we can conclude that when analyzing a function, it is sufficient to have value-flow
paths in ΠIN(Vfp,Vsink), ΠOUT(Vsrc,Vfr) and ΠSL(Vfp,Vfr) from callees. □
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